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Issue #2/2024
O. A. Koshkareva
On the Goal Attainability of the Current Concept of Technological Development. Part II
On the Goal Attainability of the Current Concept of Technological Development. Part II
DOI: 10.22184/1993-7296.FRos.2024.18.2.98.114
Institute of Science Development Problems, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
In continuation of the brief overview of the technological development concept of the Russian Federation until 2030, we have continued to consider the structure, principles and goals described in the Concept. Definitions of the degrading and negative innovations are provided. The conclusions are drawn in relation to the strengths and weaknesses of the Concept (deviation from the standard statistical indicators and application of ill-advised reference points) and the solutions are proposed aimed at the correction of weakness consequences.
Institute of Science Development Problems, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
In continuation of the brief overview of the technological development concept of the Russian Federation until 2030, we have continued to consider the structure, principles and goals described in the Concept. Definitions of the degrading and negative innovations are provided. The conclusions are drawn in relation to the strengths and weaknesses of the Concept (deviation from the standard statistical indicators and application of ill-advised reference points) and the solutions are proposed aimed at the correction of weakness consequences.
Теги: critical technologies “end-to-end” technologies indicators of achievement of technological development goals technological sovereignty концепция технологического развития критические технологии показатели достижения целей технологического развития сoncept of technological development сквозные технологии технологический суверенитет
On the Goal Attainability of the Current Concept of Technological Development
Part II
O. A. Koshkareva
Institute of Science Development Problems, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
In continuation of the brief overview of the technological development concept of the Russian Federation until 2030, we have continued to consider the structure, principles and goals described in the Concept. Definitions of the degrading and negative innovations are provided. The conclusions are drawn in relation to the strengths and weaknesses of the Concept (deviation from the standard statistical indicators and application of ill-advised reference points) and the solutions are proposed aimed at the correction of weakness consequences.
Key words: Сoncept of Technological Development, indicators of achievement of technological development goals, technological sovereignty, “end-to-end” technologies, critical technologies
Article received: December 01, 2023
Article accepted: January 11, 2024
The first part of the article has provided a brief overview of the technological development concept until 2030 and examined the achievement indicators for the first of the goals set. In this part we will continue to consider the following aspects of the document: goals and their indicators.
Achievement indicators for the goal titled “Transition to the innovation-oriented economic growth, consolidation of the technology role as a factor in the development of the economy and social sphere”
It is necessary to start with the fact that, according to the author, the goal is not phrased correctly. Should we understand that “Transition to the innovation-oriented economic growth” means that the economic growth should be aimed at innovation? The innovations shall not be the goal, despite the fact that most experts believe that innovation a priori has a beneficial effect on the socio-economic development. The achievement indicators for the goal set are as follows (see Table 6).
The calculation methodology for the innovation activity level of organizations was adopted by the Federal State Statistics Service in 2019. It is calculated for the reporting year as the ratio of the number of innovatively active entities to the total number of interviewed entities [13]. Not all innovations are developed equal. Firstly, it is necessary to note the existence of such innovations when, for certain reasons, an entity proceeds to use the simpler technologies and less technologically advanced solutions. Thus, a significant rollback of the technologies used has occurred as a result of the sanction imposition against our country. For example, the automotive industry was faced with a shortage of electronic components. As a result, it was forced to reconfigure its production and return to the mechanical brake system modules, completely abandon the airbags and modern engines, while returning to the engines used in the 80s of the last century (the current situation has begun to be improved) [14]. It should be noted that the Western automotive industry is now also facing a shortage of components due to the limited supplies from China. As a result, many European and American cars have been deprived of some options that have long been taken for granted. However, all these changes also fit the definition of innovation. We shall define innovations that result in the introduction of more primitive technologies as the degrading ones.
Secondly, there are innovations that increase only the profit of the owner who has introduced them, while simultaneously leading to a decrease in the quality of products, since the cost of low-quality goods is significantly lower. Moreover, absence of the need to notify the customers about the changed properties of products and the customer’s inability to verify these properties on site leads to the competition between the products with various consumer properties, which the consumer may not even be aware of. An example can be dairy and milk-containing products, about the existence of which many consumers has had no idea for a long period of time. The government intervention only, including the requirement to place these products in different show cases, has led to the fact that the buyers know what exactly they are purchasing. Thus, the author proposes to call innovations negative, if their purpose is solely to increase profits and if they simultaneously lead to one or more of the following (obviously predictable) effects:
significant deterioration in the consumer properties of a product or service;
increased harm to the environment compared to the previous technology applied;
obvious negative socio-economic or political effects.
At present, there are more and more such innovations. In pursuit of cost reduction, the producers purchase the components with the increasingly lower quality. The producers are aware of these changes, but they are in no hurry to inform the customers. Thus, the buyer of a Lada car is not provided with information about whether the car has a brake power distributor or ABS. If we introduce a clear classification of what is considered innovation and what is not, but significantly improve the tax regime for the entities introducing innovations, then we may well get a significant statistical increase in the number of entities that decrease costs by reducing the product quality and indicate this process as innovation.
Growth Rate of Costs for Innovation Activities (in Comparable Prices, to the Level Available in 2022)
The growth rate of costs for innovation activities in the comparable prices available in 2022 shall be increased by more than one and a half times (Table 6). The domestic statistics do not consider such an indicator as “Growth rate of costs for innovation activities”, but provide the indicator “Costs for innovation activities of the entities” (Table 7). We shall assume that the concept authors have had in mind the growth of this particular indicator.
The dynamic pattern of the indicator “Costs for innovation activities of the entities” since 2012 is given in Fig. 3. As can be seen, from 2013 to 2018 there was a “plateau”: the costs fluctuated around the reference level given in 2013. In 2019, there was a transition to a new “plateau”, and from 2019 to 2022 this indicator already fluctuated at the level 130 (±5)% relative to the reference year. It should be noted that this change occurred not as a result of real adjustments in the Russian economy. The increase was due to the fact that the changes have occurred in the assessment methods for the overall level of innovation activities. From 2010 to 2018, the indicators were calculated in accordance with the third edition of the Oslo Manual (Guidelines for Collecting, Reporting and Using Data on Innovation). In 2018, the fourth edition of the Oslo Manual was published [15]. Thus, it cannot be said that over the past 10 years Russia has achieved a significant increase in the cost of innovations.
If it is possible to obtain a statistically significant increase in the indicator “costs for innovation activities of the entities”, then it can be argued that new technologies are being actively introduced in the Russian Federation. Therefore, it can be considered that the technological sovereignty of the state is better ensured. This indicator may indeed well reflect the increasing independence of our state from the foreign partners. However, the Concept demonstrates the growth rate of this indicator, i. e. actually the growth velocity. In 2022, due to inflation, the costs of innovation activities in constant prices were decreased, i. e. it was necessary to consider not the growth rate, but about the decline rate. We can only hope that by 2030 there will be an increase in the cost of innovation activities, otherwise it will be difficult to talk about any increase in the technological sovereignty of our country. So far there are no serious preconditions for a real increase in such costs.
Growth rate of the volume of innovative goods, works, services and growth rate of the volume of innovative goods, works, services of small technology companies
The growth rate of the volume of innovative goods, works, services and the growth rate of the volume of innovative goods, works, services of small technology companies (in comparable prices, to the level of 2022) is almost an expanded indicator “Share of innovative goods, works, services in the total scope of goods shipped, works performed, services rendered” proposed to monitor the goal achievement discussed above. The first indicator is almost a modified analogue, and the second one is part of its extension. Thus, the possible growth of these indicators at the given rates also seems poorly achievable, and their representativeness is quite doubtful.
Indicators reflecting the condition of small technology companies
Number of Small Technology Companies
The indicators reflecting the state of small technology companies, namely “Number of small technology companies”, “including with the revenue of more than 2 billion rubles” and “Growth rate of investments in the small technology companies (in comparable prices, to the level of 2022)”, require the development of a calculation methodology. There are currently no official statistics related to the small technology enterprises. Accordingly, there is no data on investments in such enterprises. On August 04, 2023, the Federal Law No. 478-FZ “On the development of technology companies in the Russian Federation” was passed. According to this law, the small technology companies will be included in a special register to become the basis for the preparation of targeted supportive measures, including the search for companies for the nursery program implementation. In addition, it is expected that the platform will provide great opportunities to attract the additional private funding for the project implementation. In 2023, the Ministry of Economic Development announced the establishment of a “Register of Small Technology Companies” in order to prepare the targeted supportive measures for the small technology companies. It is expected that their number is currently about 10 thousand. At the end of November 2023, the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation has launched the “Startup Showcase ” for the investors’ portal “Vzlyot” [16]. In addition to this showcase, there are currently some other supportive measures for the small technology companies, but most of the announced measures have not yet been launched.
It seems that such a register could become an important tool for the venture investment market development, the private funding promotion for technology projects and support of the innovation activities in Russia. A. R. Belousov, the first deputy chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, believes that the amount of attracted private investments in the small technology companies should become the main efficiency indicator of the Ministry of Economic Development and development institutions as a part of technological sovereignty provision [16].
A. N. Shokhin, head of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, believes that such an information system can become an efficient platform for attracting investments in the technology sector and thus qualitatively increase the level of innovation activity in the Russian economy [17].
The system will become a database that allows to collect, store, and verify data related to the small companies and startups. The entities registered in the system will automatically gain access to the public supportive measures. The prospective investors will be able to search for conditions and companies that suit them and receive all the necessary information to make an investment decision [18]. At present, the register is not widely available. If this tool starts working, then we can hope that it will really seriously contribute to the technological development of Russia.
As for the indicators, they look rather strange. For example, it is expected that the number of small technology companies should be increased by almost 2.5 times by 2030. It is expected that a small technology company will maintain its status for 3 years upon its inclusion into the register (author’s note: it is entirely unclear why a small technology company should lose this status in three years, since if it does not cease to exist, then it will highly likely not cease to be small or technology). Moreover, many companies are included in the register “automatically” if they have received support from one of the development institutions. Thus, if the supportive measures turn out to be useful for the companies concerned, then during the first years we can expect a large number of companies registered in the register, while especially considering those who got there “not by choice”. However, over time, the existing companies will lose this status, and it is far from clear that the number of newly established companies will be so large.
Growth Rate of Investments in the Small Technology Companies
An even more strange indicator is “Growth rate of investments in the small technology companies (in comparable prices, to the level of 2022)”. There is currently no information about any investments in the small technology enterprises. However, the figures available for 2022 are taken as 100%. At best, the register will be operational in the test mode only this year. Thus, the first comparison can only be made at the end of 2025. At the same time, if we officially accept the investments in small enterprises in 2022 as not equal to zero, but simultaneously significantly less than the results obtained in 2024, then the achievement of indicators specified by the concept can be ensured during the first year of observation.
Number of Patent Applications for Inventions and Utility Models
The achievability of indicator “Number of patent applications for inventions and utility models filed by the Russian applicants in the Russian Federation and abroad under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)” also looks doubtful. As the studies have shown, the number of patent applications is closely related to the number of researchers and scope of scientific funding [19]. For example, in 2015 in Russia the ratio of the number of researchers per patent application was 15.2, while Russia occupied the 8th place in the world. In recent years, the number of researchers in Russia has decreased slightly, but the number of patent applications has been increased by more than 3 times. If in 2015 the number of applications submitted by the domestic applicants was 29,269, then in 2022 it was already 97,898 [20]. Currently the ratio of the number of researchers per patent application is 3.98 that provides for the 5th place in the world and is very close to the US indicators at the level of 3.11 [21]. According to the Annual City-based Report of the Federal State Statistics Service, “at present, Russia is among the top ten world leaders in the number of patent applications” [22]. This fact suggests that, while maintaining the current number of researchers and the scope of research funding, Russia is very close to the upper limit of the number of patent applications submitted annually.
The procedure under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) is currently the simplest and most profitable one if there is a task to protect own intellectual property outside of Russia. However, it is necessary to add to everything that has already been provided in this paper about the patenting dubiousness, that patenting under the European Patent Convention has been previously available. However, after March 1, 2022, the European Patent Office has not accepted any applications from the Federal Service for Intellectual Property, Patents and Trademarks and has not cooperated with the Eurasian Patent Office. Due to the sanctions imposed, violations of international law and general unfriendly attitude of a number of countries towards our state, there are some concerns occurred in relation to the inviolability of intellectual property issued in the form of patents by the Russian applicants outside our country.
Achievement Indicators for the Goal Titled “Technological Support for the Sustainable Functioning and Development of Production Systems”
All indicators for this goal achievement require the development of an assessment methodology, and for all of them some benchmarks are set (see Table 8).
Growth Rate Of the Non-Resource Non-Energy Exports (in Comparable Prices, to the Level of 2022)
Increase in the non-resource non-energy exports has become the main goal of the national project “International Cooperation and Export”, when in 2018 the President of Russia indicated the need to double it within six years.
The non-resource products of lower processing level include the goods specified by a low processing degree and its simplicity: primary plant products, chemicals, fertilizers, lumber, processed stone, cast iron, steel, unprocessed non-ferrous and precious metals;
The non-resource products of medium processing level include the intermediate products being the result of fairly deep processing of source materials (meat, cellulose, rolled steel), as well as the low-complexity finished products (flour, cereals, vegetable oils, sugar, soap, construction wooden products, facing tiles, structural blocks, pipes, etc.);
The non-resource products of upper processing level include the finished goods being the result of deep processing of source materials, such as the engineering products, high-tech materials, pharmaceutical products, household chemicals, clothing, shoes, furniture, toys, printing products, food products (canned food, confectionery and baked goods, cheeses etc.), as well as intermediate products (for example, radioactive compounds and drug components).
As of November 2022, due to sanctions, direct losses of 20 key sectors of the Russia’s NNE in 2022 amounted to 19% of the previous year’s volumes for the same period. In total, the export volumes were decreased by $25.7 billion. However, in the history of Russia there is an example of decades-long continuous growth in the non-energy exports. We are talking about the period from 2001 to 2007, when the indicator was increased by almost threefold, including increased in the export of engineering products by almost twofold, in the export of food – by almost sixfold, and in the export of metals – by more than threefold. [23]. However, the indicator is phrased not as “the export volumes…”, but as “the growth rate of export volumes…”, and even by the year during which the volumes of non-resource non-energy exports were decreased significantly. This fact, in turn, leads to the questions both about the indicator and about achievability of the given targets.
According to the Concept of Technological Development, “Share of the processing industry entities performing technological innovations” should increase from 29% in 2022 to 45% in 2030 (author’s note: information of the Federal State Statistics Service differs from information given in the Concept and amounts to 22.8%). If we consider the statistics of this indicator by year since 2010 (Fig. 4), it is possible to see that the significant changes in this indicator were related to the release of already mentioned 4th edition of the Oslo Manual with the Guidelines for Collecting, Reporting and Using Data on Innovation. Thus, if there are no global changes in the country that contribute to a more active innovation implementation into the production process, then such a significant increase in the indicator under study can only be expected if the next edition of the Oslo Manual is released.
As has been already mentioned, there are quite a lot of innovations being introduced at the industrial enterprises, but unfortunately, they are often related to either degrading innovations or negative ones. It is possible that if the incentive measures are taken for the entities implementing innovations, they will actively demonstrate such kinds of innovations. However, how will this indicator reflect the technological support for sustainability of the production systems? If we consider the situation in more detail, then the introduction of technological innovations at an industrial enterprise is a very costly and complicated activity that often includes the staff training, the equipment adjustment, and sometimes even its replacement, changes in the technological process; it may require any changes in the logistic chains, etc. To decide on this, the corporate directors shall be sure that any change in their profits will quickly pay off all the costs related to the introduction of innovations. No matter how much this contradicts the ideas of innovation, in the real economic conditions, the innovations are most often not economically justified. Thus, there is no reason to expect that almost 50% of industrial enterprises will introduce any innovations.
The state technological sovereignty directly depends on the degree to which a country can provide itself with the high-tech products. The Federal State Statistics Service does not consider the following indicators: “Share of the high-tech industrial products produced in the territory of the Russian Federation in the consumption level of such products in the Russian Federation”. According to the Concept, in 2022 this ratio was equal to 56.1%. By 2030, this ratio should reach 75%. It is difficult to determine the real possibility to achieve a given aim, since there are no publicly available statistical data devoted to this indicator. The Concept indicates that the calculation method for this indicator needs to be developed. However, it remains unclear how the concept authors were able to assess this indicator in 2022 and how it will be understandable that it would be possible to achieve the goals set by 2030.
The calculation methodology for the indicator “Share of goods produced at the industrial facilities that have a negative environmental impact and classified as the category I, with the confirmed application of the best available technologies in the total scope of shipped goods produced at the industrial facilities that have a negative environmental impact and classified to the category I» also needs to be developed. However, it is assumed that over 7 years during which the Concept will be in effect, most part of the enterprises that have the most negative environmental impact will turn to the best available production technologies. Moreover, the share of goods at such enterprises will be increased from 2 to 99%. There is no publicly available data to assess the current state of affairs and trends in the situation development. Certainly, it is possible to get the industrial entities to implement the best technologies by applying the significant fines, strengthening environmental control and introducing preferences to encourage the innovation process. It remains unclear whether it is possible to achieve such an impressive result without casing bankruptcy to the environmentally neglected industries.
Conclusion
The concept of technological development is an important strategic document of national security in terms of ensuring technological sovereignty. The concept contains an extensive glossary of terms. It systematizes various goals, approaches and their achievement mechanisms. Many of the principles and mechanisms proposed look rational and rather viable. The role of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation is separately emphasized. Due to the Concept, a register of small technology companies has been established, the measures to support and stimulate such companies have been developed and partially implemented.
However, the document has insufficiently developed aspects; the most obvious ones include the available contradictions within the document. According to the author, in some parts of the document there is an excessive emphasis on the end-to-end technologies, despite the fact that such end-to-end technologies represent a very limited set of technologies that do not completely cover the technological needs of the Russian economy. Among the 16 proposed indicators, 12 indicators require the development of calculation methods. Moreover, as it is shown in the article, the achievability of many indicators looks rather doubtful. Some indicators are not very representative and their application does not seem appropriate for assessing the goals set in the concept. Any deviation from the standard statistical indicators and application of the ill-conceived reference points leads to the fact that it will be difficult to justify, verify and evaluate the concept implementation results.
According to the author, firstly, it is necessary to return to the use of standard statistical indicators or integral indicators based on the standard ones. This approach will allow for a better understanding of the indicator developmental trends over time. In addition, it will provide sufficient transparency in the assessment and verification and will allow for a reliable assessment of progress achieved during the concept implementation procedure.
Secondly, more attention shall be paid to the critical technologies and their production, especially in the sectors that are strategically important for the state existence. The concentration primarily on the end-to-end technologies will not allow to achieve technological sovereignty.
REFERENCES
Order No. 818 dated December 27, 2019 “On approval of the methodology for calculating the indicator ‘Level of innovative activity of organizations’” was approved by Rosstat Order No. 818 13 dated December 27, 2019
Bagdasarov E., Sazonov K. I’m standing at a stop: Russian cars have become better at braking. The usual options are returning to the UAZ and Lada. Izvestia AVTO March 13, 2023, 00:02. URL: https://iz.ru/1481513/evgenii-bagdasarov-kirill-sazonov/stoiu-na-polustanochke-rossiiskie-avtomobili-stali-luchshe-tormozit
Oslo Manual 2018 Guidelines for Collecting, Reporting and Using Data on Innovation, 4th Edition. URL: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/oslo-manual‑2018_9789264304604‑en.
The Ministry of Economic Development of Russia has launched a Showcase of startups for investors. URL: https://economy.gov.ru/material/news/minekonomrazvitiya_rossii_zapustilo_vitrinu_startapov_dlya_investorov.html
Andrey Belousov: By the end of the year, the Government will launch a register of small technology companies and an information system to find investors. URL: http://government.ru/news/49094/.
A register of small tech companies will appear in Russia. URL: https://rg.ru/2023/06/14/startapam-nashli-mesto.html
Volkova T. I., Usoltsev I. A. Inventive activity of researchers: cross-country. The economy of the region. 2017; 13(1): 290–307.
The annual official publication of the Federal Service for Intellectual Property (Rospatent) ROSPATENT IN FIGURES AND FACTS. Annual Report ‘22 URL: https://rospatent.gov.ru/content/uploadfiles/otchet‑2022‑ru.pdf Date of application: 10/18/2023.
Statistical profile of countries on intellectual property. 2021 USA. URL: https://www.wipo.int/edocs/statistics-country-profile/ru/us.pdf.
Annual official publication of the Federal Service for Intellectual Property (Rospatent) ROSPATENT IN FIGURES AND FACTS. Annual Report ’22. URL: https://rospatent.gov.ru/content/uploadfiles/otchet‑2022‑ru.pdf Date of application: 10/18/2023
Federal Customs Service. Results of foreign trade of the subjects of the Russian Federation (non-primary non-energy exports). URL: https://customs.gov.ru/statistic/exp-rf-msp/vntorg-smp-nesyr-neenerget-export.
AUTHOR
Oksana Andreevna Koshkareva, Researcher, Sector for Financial and Economic Problems of Science Development, Department for Research of KnowledgeBased Economy and Foresight, Institute of Science Development Problems, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISDP RAS), Moscow, Russia.
Part II
O. A. Koshkareva
Institute of Science Development Problems, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
In continuation of the brief overview of the technological development concept of the Russian Federation until 2030, we have continued to consider the structure, principles and goals described in the Concept. Definitions of the degrading and negative innovations are provided. The conclusions are drawn in relation to the strengths and weaknesses of the Concept (deviation from the standard statistical indicators and application of ill-advised reference points) and the solutions are proposed aimed at the correction of weakness consequences.
Key words: Сoncept of Technological Development, indicators of achievement of technological development goals, technological sovereignty, “end-to-end” technologies, critical technologies
Article received: December 01, 2023
Article accepted: January 11, 2024
The first part of the article has provided a brief overview of the technological development concept until 2030 and examined the achievement indicators for the first of the goals set. In this part we will continue to consider the following aspects of the document: goals and their indicators.
Achievement indicators for the goal titled “Transition to the innovation-oriented economic growth, consolidation of the technology role as a factor in the development of the economy and social sphere”
It is necessary to start with the fact that, according to the author, the goal is not phrased correctly. Should we understand that “Transition to the innovation-oriented economic growth” means that the economic growth should be aimed at innovation? The innovations shall not be the goal, despite the fact that most experts believe that innovation a priori has a beneficial effect on the socio-economic development. The achievement indicators for the goal set are as follows (see Table 6).
The calculation methodology for the innovation activity level of organizations was adopted by the Federal State Statistics Service in 2019. It is calculated for the reporting year as the ratio of the number of innovatively active entities to the total number of interviewed entities [13]. Not all innovations are developed equal. Firstly, it is necessary to note the existence of such innovations when, for certain reasons, an entity proceeds to use the simpler technologies and less technologically advanced solutions. Thus, a significant rollback of the technologies used has occurred as a result of the sanction imposition against our country. For example, the automotive industry was faced with a shortage of electronic components. As a result, it was forced to reconfigure its production and return to the mechanical brake system modules, completely abandon the airbags and modern engines, while returning to the engines used in the 80s of the last century (the current situation has begun to be improved) [14]. It should be noted that the Western automotive industry is now also facing a shortage of components due to the limited supplies from China. As a result, many European and American cars have been deprived of some options that have long been taken for granted. However, all these changes also fit the definition of innovation. We shall define innovations that result in the introduction of more primitive technologies as the degrading ones.
Secondly, there are innovations that increase only the profit of the owner who has introduced them, while simultaneously leading to a decrease in the quality of products, since the cost of low-quality goods is significantly lower. Moreover, absence of the need to notify the customers about the changed properties of products and the customer’s inability to verify these properties on site leads to the competition between the products with various consumer properties, which the consumer may not even be aware of. An example can be dairy and milk-containing products, about the existence of which many consumers has had no idea for a long period of time. The government intervention only, including the requirement to place these products in different show cases, has led to the fact that the buyers know what exactly they are purchasing. Thus, the author proposes to call innovations negative, if their purpose is solely to increase profits and if they simultaneously lead to one or more of the following (obviously predictable) effects:
significant deterioration in the consumer properties of a product or service;
increased harm to the environment compared to the previous technology applied;
obvious negative socio-economic or political effects.
At present, there are more and more such innovations. In pursuit of cost reduction, the producers purchase the components with the increasingly lower quality. The producers are aware of these changes, but they are in no hurry to inform the customers. Thus, the buyer of a Lada car is not provided with information about whether the car has a brake power distributor or ABS. If we introduce a clear classification of what is considered innovation and what is not, but significantly improve the tax regime for the entities introducing innovations, then we may well get a significant statistical increase in the number of entities that decrease costs by reducing the product quality and indicate this process as innovation.
Growth Rate of Costs for Innovation Activities (in Comparable Prices, to the Level Available in 2022)
The growth rate of costs for innovation activities in the comparable prices available in 2022 shall be increased by more than one and a half times (Table 6). The domestic statistics do not consider such an indicator as “Growth rate of costs for innovation activities”, but provide the indicator “Costs for innovation activities of the entities” (Table 7). We shall assume that the concept authors have had in mind the growth of this particular indicator.
The dynamic pattern of the indicator “Costs for innovation activities of the entities” since 2012 is given in Fig. 3. As can be seen, from 2013 to 2018 there was a “plateau”: the costs fluctuated around the reference level given in 2013. In 2019, there was a transition to a new “plateau”, and from 2019 to 2022 this indicator already fluctuated at the level 130 (±5)% relative to the reference year. It should be noted that this change occurred not as a result of real adjustments in the Russian economy. The increase was due to the fact that the changes have occurred in the assessment methods for the overall level of innovation activities. From 2010 to 2018, the indicators were calculated in accordance with the third edition of the Oslo Manual (Guidelines for Collecting, Reporting and Using Data on Innovation). In 2018, the fourth edition of the Oslo Manual was published [15]. Thus, it cannot be said that over the past 10 years Russia has achieved a significant increase in the cost of innovations.
If it is possible to obtain a statistically significant increase in the indicator “costs for innovation activities of the entities”, then it can be argued that new technologies are being actively introduced in the Russian Federation. Therefore, it can be considered that the technological sovereignty of the state is better ensured. This indicator may indeed well reflect the increasing independence of our state from the foreign partners. However, the Concept demonstrates the growth rate of this indicator, i. e. actually the growth velocity. In 2022, due to inflation, the costs of innovation activities in constant prices were decreased, i. e. it was necessary to consider not the growth rate, but about the decline rate. We can only hope that by 2030 there will be an increase in the cost of innovation activities, otherwise it will be difficult to talk about any increase in the technological sovereignty of our country. So far there are no serious preconditions for a real increase in such costs.
Growth rate of the volume of innovative goods, works, services and growth rate of the volume of innovative goods, works, services of small technology companies
The growth rate of the volume of innovative goods, works, services and the growth rate of the volume of innovative goods, works, services of small technology companies (in comparable prices, to the level of 2022) is almost an expanded indicator “Share of innovative goods, works, services in the total scope of goods shipped, works performed, services rendered” proposed to monitor the goal achievement discussed above. The first indicator is almost a modified analogue, and the second one is part of its extension. Thus, the possible growth of these indicators at the given rates also seems poorly achievable, and their representativeness is quite doubtful.
Indicators reflecting the condition of small technology companies
Number of Small Technology Companies
The indicators reflecting the state of small technology companies, namely “Number of small technology companies”, “including with the revenue of more than 2 billion rubles” and “Growth rate of investments in the small technology companies (in comparable prices, to the level of 2022)”, require the development of a calculation methodology. There are currently no official statistics related to the small technology enterprises. Accordingly, there is no data on investments in such enterprises. On August 04, 2023, the Federal Law No. 478-FZ “On the development of technology companies in the Russian Federation” was passed. According to this law, the small technology companies will be included in a special register to become the basis for the preparation of targeted supportive measures, including the search for companies for the nursery program implementation. In addition, it is expected that the platform will provide great opportunities to attract the additional private funding for the project implementation. In 2023, the Ministry of Economic Development announced the establishment of a “Register of Small Technology Companies” in order to prepare the targeted supportive measures for the small technology companies. It is expected that their number is currently about 10 thousand. At the end of November 2023, the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation has launched the “Startup Showcase ” for the investors’ portal “Vzlyot” [16]. In addition to this showcase, there are currently some other supportive measures for the small technology companies, but most of the announced measures have not yet been launched.
It seems that such a register could become an important tool for the venture investment market development, the private funding promotion for technology projects and support of the innovation activities in Russia. A. R. Belousov, the first deputy chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, believes that the amount of attracted private investments in the small technology companies should become the main efficiency indicator of the Ministry of Economic Development and development institutions as a part of technological sovereignty provision [16].
A. N. Shokhin, head of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, believes that such an information system can become an efficient platform for attracting investments in the technology sector and thus qualitatively increase the level of innovation activity in the Russian economy [17].
The system will become a database that allows to collect, store, and verify data related to the small companies and startups. The entities registered in the system will automatically gain access to the public supportive measures. The prospective investors will be able to search for conditions and companies that suit them and receive all the necessary information to make an investment decision [18]. At present, the register is not widely available. If this tool starts working, then we can hope that it will really seriously contribute to the technological development of Russia.
As for the indicators, they look rather strange. For example, it is expected that the number of small technology companies should be increased by almost 2.5 times by 2030. It is expected that a small technology company will maintain its status for 3 years upon its inclusion into the register (author’s note: it is entirely unclear why a small technology company should lose this status in three years, since if it does not cease to exist, then it will highly likely not cease to be small or technology). Moreover, many companies are included in the register “automatically” if they have received support from one of the development institutions. Thus, if the supportive measures turn out to be useful for the companies concerned, then during the first years we can expect a large number of companies registered in the register, while especially considering those who got there “not by choice”. However, over time, the existing companies will lose this status, and it is far from clear that the number of newly established companies will be so large.
Growth Rate of Investments in the Small Technology Companies
An even more strange indicator is “Growth rate of investments in the small technology companies (in comparable prices, to the level of 2022)”. There is currently no information about any investments in the small technology enterprises. However, the figures available for 2022 are taken as 100%. At best, the register will be operational in the test mode only this year. Thus, the first comparison can only be made at the end of 2025. At the same time, if we officially accept the investments in small enterprises in 2022 as not equal to zero, but simultaneously significantly less than the results obtained in 2024, then the achievement of indicators specified by the concept can be ensured during the first year of observation.
Number of Patent Applications for Inventions and Utility Models
The achievability of indicator “Number of patent applications for inventions and utility models filed by the Russian applicants in the Russian Federation and abroad under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)” also looks doubtful. As the studies have shown, the number of patent applications is closely related to the number of researchers and scope of scientific funding [19]. For example, in 2015 in Russia the ratio of the number of researchers per patent application was 15.2, while Russia occupied the 8th place in the world. In recent years, the number of researchers in Russia has decreased slightly, but the number of patent applications has been increased by more than 3 times. If in 2015 the number of applications submitted by the domestic applicants was 29,269, then in 2022 it was already 97,898 [20]. Currently the ratio of the number of researchers per patent application is 3.98 that provides for the 5th place in the world and is very close to the US indicators at the level of 3.11 [21]. According to the Annual City-based Report of the Federal State Statistics Service, “at present, Russia is among the top ten world leaders in the number of patent applications” [22]. This fact suggests that, while maintaining the current number of researchers and the scope of research funding, Russia is very close to the upper limit of the number of patent applications submitted annually.
The procedure under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) is currently the simplest and most profitable one if there is a task to protect own intellectual property outside of Russia. However, it is necessary to add to everything that has already been provided in this paper about the patenting dubiousness, that patenting under the European Patent Convention has been previously available. However, after March 1, 2022, the European Patent Office has not accepted any applications from the Federal Service for Intellectual Property, Patents and Trademarks and has not cooperated with the Eurasian Patent Office. Due to the sanctions imposed, violations of international law and general unfriendly attitude of a number of countries towards our state, there are some concerns occurred in relation to the inviolability of intellectual property issued in the form of patents by the Russian applicants outside our country.
Achievement Indicators for the Goal Titled “Technological Support for the Sustainable Functioning and Development of Production Systems”
All indicators for this goal achievement require the development of an assessment methodology, and for all of them some benchmarks are set (see Table 8).
Growth Rate Of the Non-Resource Non-Energy Exports (in Comparable Prices, to the Level of 2022)
Increase in the non-resource non-energy exports has become the main goal of the national project “International Cooperation and Export”, when in 2018 the President of Russia indicated the need to double it within six years.
The non-resource products of lower processing level include the goods specified by a low processing degree and its simplicity: primary plant products, chemicals, fertilizers, lumber, processed stone, cast iron, steel, unprocessed non-ferrous and precious metals;
The non-resource products of medium processing level include the intermediate products being the result of fairly deep processing of source materials (meat, cellulose, rolled steel), as well as the low-complexity finished products (flour, cereals, vegetable oils, sugar, soap, construction wooden products, facing tiles, structural blocks, pipes, etc.);
The non-resource products of upper processing level include the finished goods being the result of deep processing of source materials, such as the engineering products, high-tech materials, pharmaceutical products, household chemicals, clothing, shoes, furniture, toys, printing products, food products (canned food, confectionery and baked goods, cheeses etc.), as well as intermediate products (for example, radioactive compounds and drug components).
As of November 2022, due to sanctions, direct losses of 20 key sectors of the Russia’s NNE in 2022 amounted to 19% of the previous year’s volumes for the same period. In total, the export volumes were decreased by $25.7 billion. However, in the history of Russia there is an example of decades-long continuous growth in the non-energy exports. We are talking about the period from 2001 to 2007, when the indicator was increased by almost threefold, including increased in the export of engineering products by almost twofold, in the export of food – by almost sixfold, and in the export of metals – by more than threefold. [23]. However, the indicator is phrased not as “the export volumes…”, but as “the growth rate of export volumes…”, and even by the year during which the volumes of non-resource non-energy exports were decreased significantly. This fact, in turn, leads to the questions both about the indicator and about achievability of the given targets.
According to the Concept of Technological Development, “Share of the processing industry entities performing technological innovations” should increase from 29% in 2022 to 45% in 2030 (author’s note: information of the Federal State Statistics Service differs from information given in the Concept and amounts to 22.8%). If we consider the statistics of this indicator by year since 2010 (Fig. 4), it is possible to see that the significant changes in this indicator were related to the release of already mentioned 4th edition of the Oslo Manual with the Guidelines for Collecting, Reporting and Using Data on Innovation. Thus, if there are no global changes in the country that contribute to a more active innovation implementation into the production process, then such a significant increase in the indicator under study can only be expected if the next edition of the Oslo Manual is released.
As has been already mentioned, there are quite a lot of innovations being introduced at the industrial enterprises, but unfortunately, they are often related to either degrading innovations or negative ones. It is possible that if the incentive measures are taken for the entities implementing innovations, they will actively demonstrate such kinds of innovations. However, how will this indicator reflect the technological support for sustainability of the production systems? If we consider the situation in more detail, then the introduction of technological innovations at an industrial enterprise is a very costly and complicated activity that often includes the staff training, the equipment adjustment, and sometimes even its replacement, changes in the technological process; it may require any changes in the logistic chains, etc. To decide on this, the corporate directors shall be sure that any change in their profits will quickly pay off all the costs related to the introduction of innovations. No matter how much this contradicts the ideas of innovation, in the real economic conditions, the innovations are most often not economically justified. Thus, there is no reason to expect that almost 50% of industrial enterprises will introduce any innovations.
The state technological sovereignty directly depends on the degree to which a country can provide itself with the high-tech products. The Federal State Statistics Service does not consider the following indicators: “Share of the high-tech industrial products produced in the territory of the Russian Federation in the consumption level of such products in the Russian Federation”. According to the Concept, in 2022 this ratio was equal to 56.1%. By 2030, this ratio should reach 75%. It is difficult to determine the real possibility to achieve a given aim, since there are no publicly available statistical data devoted to this indicator. The Concept indicates that the calculation method for this indicator needs to be developed. However, it remains unclear how the concept authors were able to assess this indicator in 2022 and how it will be understandable that it would be possible to achieve the goals set by 2030.
The calculation methodology for the indicator “Share of goods produced at the industrial facilities that have a negative environmental impact and classified as the category I, with the confirmed application of the best available technologies in the total scope of shipped goods produced at the industrial facilities that have a negative environmental impact and classified to the category I» also needs to be developed. However, it is assumed that over 7 years during which the Concept will be in effect, most part of the enterprises that have the most negative environmental impact will turn to the best available production technologies. Moreover, the share of goods at such enterprises will be increased from 2 to 99%. There is no publicly available data to assess the current state of affairs and trends in the situation development. Certainly, it is possible to get the industrial entities to implement the best technologies by applying the significant fines, strengthening environmental control and introducing preferences to encourage the innovation process. It remains unclear whether it is possible to achieve such an impressive result without casing bankruptcy to the environmentally neglected industries.
Conclusion
The concept of technological development is an important strategic document of national security in terms of ensuring technological sovereignty. The concept contains an extensive glossary of terms. It systematizes various goals, approaches and their achievement mechanisms. Many of the principles and mechanisms proposed look rational and rather viable. The role of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation is separately emphasized. Due to the Concept, a register of small technology companies has been established, the measures to support and stimulate such companies have been developed and partially implemented.
However, the document has insufficiently developed aspects; the most obvious ones include the available contradictions within the document. According to the author, in some parts of the document there is an excessive emphasis on the end-to-end technologies, despite the fact that such end-to-end technologies represent a very limited set of technologies that do not completely cover the technological needs of the Russian economy. Among the 16 proposed indicators, 12 indicators require the development of calculation methods. Moreover, as it is shown in the article, the achievability of many indicators looks rather doubtful. Some indicators are not very representative and their application does not seem appropriate for assessing the goals set in the concept. Any deviation from the standard statistical indicators and application of the ill-conceived reference points leads to the fact that it will be difficult to justify, verify and evaluate the concept implementation results.
According to the author, firstly, it is necessary to return to the use of standard statistical indicators or integral indicators based on the standard ones. This approach will allow for a better understanding of the indicator developmental trends over time. In addition, it will provide sufficient transparency in the assessment and verification and will allow for a reliable assessment of progress achieved during the concept implementation procedure.
Secondly, more attention shall be paid to the critical technologies and their production, especially in the sectors that are strategically important for the state existence. The concentration primarily on the end-to-end technologies will not allow to achieve technological sovereignty.
REFERENCES
Order No. 818 dated December 27, 2019 “On approval of the methodology for calculating the indicator ‘Level of innovative activity of organizations’” was approved by Rosstat Order No. 818 13 dated December 27, 2019
Bagdasarov E., Sazonov K. I’m standing at a stop: Russian cars have become better at braking. The usual options are returning to the UAZ and Lada. Izvestia AVTO March 13, 2023, 00:02. URL: https://iz.ru/1481513/evgenii-bagdasarov-kirill-sazonov/stoiu-na-polustanochke-rossiiskie-avtomobili-stali-luchshe-tormozit
Oslo Manual 2018 Guidelines for Collecting, Reporting and Using Data on Innovation, 4th Edition. URL: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/oslo-manual‑2018_9789264304604‑en.
The Ministry of Economic Development of Russia has launched a Showcase of startups for investors. URL: https://economy.gov.ru/material/news/minekonomrazvitiya_rossii_zapustilo_vitrinu_startapov_dlya_investorov.html
Andrey Belousov: By the end of the year, the Government will launch a register of small technology companies and an information system to find investors. URL: http://government.ru/news/49094/.
A register of small tech companies will appear in Russia. URL: https://rg.ru/2023/06/14/startapam-nashli-mesto.html
Volkova T. I., Usoltsev I. A. Inventive activity of researchers: cross-country. The economy of the region. 2017; 13(1): 290–307.
The annual official publication of the Federal Service for Intellectual Property (Rospatent) ROSPATENT IN FIGURES AND FACTS. Annual Report ‘22 URL: https://rospatent.gov.ru/content/uploadfiles/otchet‑2022‑ru.pdf Date of application: 10/18/2023.
Statistical profile of countries on intellectual property. 2021 USA. URL: https://www.wipo.int/edocs/statistics-country-profile/ru/us.pdf.
Annual official publication of the Federal Service for Intellectual Property (Rospatent) ROSPATENT IN FIGURES AND FACTS. Annual Report ’22. URL: https://rospatent.gov.ru/content/uploadfiles/otchet‑2022‑ru.pdf Date of application: 10/18/2023
Federal Customs Service. Results of foreign trade of the subjects of the Russian Federation (non-primary non-energy exports). URL: https://customs.gov.ru/statistic/exp-rf-msp/vntorg-smp-nesyr-neenerget-export.
AUTHOR
Oksana Andreevna Koshkareva, Researcher, Sector for Financial and Economic Problems of Science Development, Department for Research of KnowledgeBased Economy and Foresight, Institute of Science Development Problems, Russian Academy of Sciences (ISDP RAS), Moscow, Russia.
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